Opinion: A case against "do something" policymaking by Robert L. Hetzel
I
n response to the current world recession, govern-
ments and central banks have undertaken dramatic
policy initiatives. They have enacted fiscal stimulus
packages to jump-start spending by the public. Similarly,
they created financial-aid packages to recapitalize banks
and remove their distressed assets in order to restart
lending and further jump-start spending by the public. But
are these initiatives the result of calculations made by econ-
omists using models widely vetted and supported within
the economics profession? Or are they simply meant to
respond to the “do something” imperative of the crisis?
If the policy initiatives fall into the latter category, do
they really treat the causes or merely the symptoms? A
symptom of recession is that public spending is not at the
level it would be if the economy were at full employment.
But does it then follow that the government should make
up the difference? Another symptom of recession is that
banks do not lend at the full employment level. So, does it
again follow that governments and central banks should
make up the difference here? 
Seemingly intuitive responses to the distress suffered
during recessions can not only be ineffective but also harm
long-term economic growth. In recession, the imperative
to end suffering leads to policies that interfere with 
markets and supersede the working of the price system.
Indeed, government intervention to deal with recessions
creates the perception that government is fixing a problem
created by free markets. These interventions tend to limit
failures among financial institutions and restrict the mar-
ket allocation of credit. A trade-off appears to arise
between policies that engender secular growth and poli-
cies that mitigate cyclical fluctuations.
When economists examine the circumstances sur-
rounding the fluctuations in output over time, they see a
correlation between financial instability (reflected in inter-
ruptions in the flow of credit) and real instability. But to
make policy, policymakers need to judge whether this cor-
relation reflects the cause or the symptom. If financial
instability is indeed the cause, what is its origin? Is it due
to the excessive risk-taking arising from the herd instincts
of investors — the proverbial speculative mania of greedy
investors? Or is it due to the excessive risk-taking arising
from a financial safety net that socializes losses while pre-
serving private gains?
The understanding that policymakers have of the rela-
tionship between risk-taking in financial markets and
macroeconomic stability will affect government regulation
of risk-taking. The regulations will, in turn, affect the
nature of financial innovation and, as a result, the ability of
markets to increase living standards over time.
It’s important to remember that financial innovation
has been a powerful contributor to the rise in welfare. For
example, the ability of families to smooth their consump-
tion over time through the use of credit can make them
better off. This ability derives from the broader availa-
bility of credit instruments to individuals. So, the policy
question should be whether the current system combines a
financial safety net with government regulation of risk-
taking by financial institutions that promotes the optimal
amount of welfare-improving financial innovation.
Policymakers should ask whether the current system
skews innovation toward strategies that provide high
returns to financial institutions in good times while impos-
ing losses on taxpayers in bad times — and, if so, how to
most effectively alter that incentive. The public might be
best served if regulators devised ways of committing not to
bail out creditors of financial institutions.
More generally, rules should replace discretion. With
respect to monetary policy, many central bankers accepted
the perennially popular explanation of cyclical fluctuations
as a manifestation of speculative euphoria followed by a
bust. At present, high-risk premia and the shift from secu-
ritization in capital markets to borrowing from banks
appear as evidence that financial markets are no longer
facilitating the transfer of funds between savers and
investors. However, if these are only symptoms of 
the increased probability of default in recessions, the diag-
nosis diverts attention away from the money creation
required to stimulate spending. As a by-product of inter-
vention into specific credit markets that many central
banks have undertaken, monetary authorities may eventu-
ally create enough money to stimulate spending. But there
is no assurance that it will be aggressive enough. Moreover,
there is no assurance that central banks will follow a
longer-run strategy to withdraw the resulting monetary
overhang when the economy recovers.
So, the creation of rules for monetary and regulatory
policy that incorporate lessons from historical experience
is important to the functioning of a healthy free-market
economy. Central bankers will have to abandon the lan-
guage of discretion for the language of rules and for the
analytical framework of economics. And both central
bankers and academics will have to take responsibility for
conveying insights in a way that an informed public can
understand. RF
Robert L. Hetzel is a senior economist and policy adviser at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. This article is based
on a longer piece published in the August 2009 issue of
Economic Affairs.
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